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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at the fundamental differences between customers and suppliers in relation 
to Cohen & Frazzini (2008) and investigates whether profitability could be a significant 
factor affecting their customer momentum returns. The paper shows that the average 
customer is larger in size and has higher profitability. These differences are statistically 
significant and persistent over time. Furthermore I show that customer –and supplier 
profitability is correlated, and that the suppliers that are linked to high (low) profitability 
customer firms also have high (low) profitability. Given that profitability is known to cause 
return predictability, I propose that profitability could be a significant factor explaining the 
customer momentum suggested by Cohen & Frazzini (2008).  
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1. Introduction 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find return predictability amongst assets that are economically 
linked through the supply chain. Specifically, a customer momentum strategy that involves 
purchasing (selling) supplier stocks whose customers have experienced a positive (negative) 
shock to their share price, will earn abnormal returns. When a firm is listed as a major 
customer in a supplier firm, any shock to a customer’s stock price should also have an effect 
on the supplier, both in real quantities and stock price. If investors fail to consider these 
important economic links, prices can generate return predictability. It is in this way that 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) argue that the anomaly stems from investor attention.  
This paper will investigate whether customers and suppliers differ systematically along a set 
of variables known to affect asset returns. Moreover, it will investigate whether profitability   
could be a significant factor affecting the customer momentum result by Cohen & Frazzini 
(2008). Looking at the fundamental difference between customers and suppliers provides 
some interesting results. While there tend to be only moderate differences in book-to-market 
and leverage ratios between customers and suppliers, the results indicate a large difference in 
terms of size and profitability. Specifically, the average customer is significantly larger than 
the average supplier and has a considerable higher level of profitability.  Part of the 
difference in size however, can be justified by the data generating process1. Profitability on 
the other hand, is more puzzling. I did find however, that the difference in profitability 
actually comes from firm size, as SG&A expenses are found to be much larger for smaller 
firms than larger firms. Given that the average supplier is much smaller than the customer, I 
find size to explain the difference in profitability.  
Even though customers (on average) outperform suppliers with respect to profitability, it is 
difficult to rationalise customer momentum using this difference in profitability. In order to 
link profitability to the findings by Cohen & Frazzini (2008) the analysis will therefore focus 
on profitability in general, and how this might affect customer/supplier return predictability. 
I find significant evidence that customer –and supplier profitability is correlated, but find the 
correlation to happen within the same year (customer profitability at time t with supplier 
                                                
1 Suppliers are required to report the identity of customer representing more than 10% of annual sales. 
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profitability at time t). Using a lag between customer –and supplier profitability significantly 
reduces the correlation. I also find evidence that shocks to customer profitability induce a 
reaction to supplier profitability in the same direction, however the results were deemed 
statistically insignificant. I lastly find that the suppliers linked to high profitability firms 
significantly outperform suppliers linked to low profitability firms. 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find evidence that customers and suppliers are, in addition to stock 
returns, correlated in terms of profits. I find them to be correlated in terms of profitability as 
well. Moreover, several studies have shown that profitability is in fact related to asset 
returns. Combining all of this yields an interesting question; can profitability be a significant 
factor affecting asset returns in the customer momentum strategy? Assume that the high 
(low) customer return stocks that Cohen & Frazzini (2008) use to form portfolios of supplier 
stocks, also have high (low) profitability. Given that the linked suppliers also tend to have 
high (low) profitability, and that there exists a profitability premium in asset markets, this 
can in return induce return predictability across stocks that are economically linked. My 
objective in this paper is not to prove that customer momentum is explained by profitability, 
rather propose an alternative explanation to the anomaly that could open up for further 
research. I conclude that the profitability correlation between customers and suppliers can be 
a significant factor affecting customer momentum, and suggest the use of a profitability 
factor loading (similar to Fama & French (2014)) in future evaluations of the customer 
momentum strategy.  
The paper will be organised as follows. First, I will provide a detailed description of the 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) paper, where I will go through the trading strategy and its 
robustness tests. Following this, I will provide the reader with some related research on 
economic links and predictable returns. I will then provide some background material on 
efficient markets, asset pricing models and factor loadings, as well as provide the reader with 
a detailed literary review on limited attention and information diffusion. I will then move on 
to a description of my dataset, followed by an analysis of how customers and suppliers differ 
systematically across variables known to influence asset prices. In the last two sections I will 
provide the reader with an analysis of customer/supplier profitability correlations, as well as 
a discussion on whether profitability should be considered for further research within 
customer momentum.   
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2. Background and Litterary Review 
2.1 Summary of Cohen & Frazzini (2008) 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find return predictability amongst assets that are economically 
linked and study customer-supplier relations at the firm level from 1980-2004. They are able 
to extract information about firms’ principal customers due to Regulation SFAS NO. 131, 
which requires all firms to report the identity of any customer representing more than 10% of 
total reported sales, profits or losses. They perform a trading strategy, which involves 
purchasing and selling supplier stocks whose customers had experienced a shock to their 
share price.  
The concept may be best explained by an example suggested by Cohen & Frazzini (2008). 
Take Coastcast Corporation, a leading supplier of golf club heads, and Callaway Golf 
Corporation, a company that provides golf equipment. Callaway was a significant 
stakeholder in Coastcast, and represented 50% of Coastcast’s total sales. In June 2001, 
Callaway lowered second quarter revenue projections by half, which subsequently led 
analysts cutting EPS forecasts by half as well. This had a significant effect on Callaway’s 
stock price, whose market value dropped by 30% in 2 days. Despite the significant downturn 
in the market value of its major customer, the reaction to Coastcast stock price was not seen 
until 2 months later (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). Had one shorted the Coastcast stock at the 
time of the drop in Callaway stock price, one could have made significant profits.  
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) refer to their findings as customer momentum, namely that there is 
return predictability amongst assets that are linked through the supply chain. This return is 
puzzling, as it is expected that any rational investor would update their expectations of the 
supplier stock whenever news about the related major customer is released into the market. 
Given that information on a supplier’s major customers is clearly and contractually stated in 
suppliers’ financial reports, this significantly challenges traditional asset pricing theory and 
EMH. They test the following hypothesis: 
Limited Attention Hypothesis: “Stock prices underreact to firm-specific information that 
induces changes in valuation of related firms, generating return predictability across assets. 
In particular, stock prices underreact to negative (positive) news involving related firms, 
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and in return generate negative (positive) subsequent price drift” (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008, 
pp.1985). 
They argue that their customer momentum findings stems from investor inattention and 
investors’ slow reaction to update expectations about related firms.  
2.1.1 Trading Strategy and Result  
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) utilize monthly stock returns, and form calendar-time portfolios 
based on one-month lagged customer returns. In month (t), they rank each supplier stock in 
ascending order based on the customer return in (t-1), and assign each supplier stock to one 
of five quintile portfolios (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008).  The lowest quintile portfolio consists 
of the supplier stocks whose customers have performed the worst, whereas the highest 
quintile portfolio only contains the supplier stocks whose customers that have performed the 
best. Every month, they sort the supplier portfolio based on last month’s customer return, 
and rebalance every month in order to maintain value/equal weights. Moreover, Cohen & 
Frazzini (2008) drop all observations with a closing price trading below $5, and all 
observations with non-missing customer or supplier returns in (t-1) and (t). 2  
 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) perform a long-short trading strategy that involves longing the 
supplier portfolio consisting of the top 20% performing customer stocks, and shorting the 
supplier portfolio consisting of the bottom 20% customer stocks. The customer momentum 
strategy performed by Cohen & Frazzini (2008) yields a statistically significant Fama & 
French (1993) monthly abnormal return of 1.45%. This translates to a yearly return of 
18.4%. Augmenting the model to include Carhart (1997)’s own stock momentum factor, and 
adjusting for Pastor & Stambaugh (2003)’s liquidity factor, has little effect on the result. The 
strategy would then earn an abnormal monthly return of 1.37% and 1.25%, respectively. 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) show that even after controlling for past returns and liquidity, 
suppliers with positive customer shocks outperform suppliers with negative customer 
shocks.  
                                                
2 Ensures that returns are not driven by microcapitalization illiquid securities (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008) 
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2.1.2 Robustness Tests 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) discuss several possible explanations to the positive alphas gained 
in the long-short trading strategy, and conduct a number of robustness tests. They suggest 
that nonsynchronous trading, liquidity, characteristics and size can help explain the anomaly. 
They first present a possibility that the customer momentum strategy could be subject to a 
lead-lag effect due to the relatively large size of the average customer. Cohen & Frazzini 
(2008) therefore drop all supplier firms in the portfolio whose customer had a higher 
turnover, higher number of analysts covering it, and higher level of institutional ownership. 
This significantly reduces the sample size, however still yields in an abnormal monthly 
return of 1.37% (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). This suggests that the lead-lag effect is not an 
issue.  
Nonsynchronous trading could also be problem, as it can generate positive autocorrelation 
across stocks. Given that Cohen & Frazzini (2008) use monthly data and choose to exclude 
any stocks in their portfolio being traded below $5, nonsynchronous trading is unlikely to be 
an issue. In order to account for a possible liquidity problem, Cohen & Frazzini (2008) 
exclude all stocks that lack strictly positive trading volume. The results however, were left 
unaffected by this adjustment. Cohen & Frazzini (2008) use Daniel & Titman (1997)’s idea 
of using characteristics to explain the returns, and therefore subtract from each stock, returns 
matched on market equity, market to book and the prior 1-year quintiles. Moreover, they 
industry adjust the returns with Fama & French (1997)’s 48 industry portfolios. None of the 
adjustments however, can explain the abnormal returns. They proceed by attempting to split 
the sample into smaller and larger firms, but again, do not affect the overall result. With 
respect to size, Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find that the monthly drift of the supplier after a 
customer shock was equally large for small and large caps, however find that large caps 
tended to converge faster.  
Several authors have researched variables that could explain commonalities of asset returns. 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) utilize Fama & MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions in 
order to control for different effects observed in asset pricing. First, in order to control for 
Jagadeesh (1990) and Jagadeesh & Titman (1993)’s reversal and price momentum effects, 
they run a regression of this month’s supplier return on the 1-month and 1-year lagged 
customer return. Moreover, Cohen & Frazzini (2008) include lagged returns of the firms’ 
and customers’ industry portfolios in order to control for Moskowitz & Grinblatt (1999)’s 
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and Menzly & Ozbas (2006)’s industry and cross industry momentum effects (respectively). 
They lastly control for Hou (2006)’s industry lead-lag effect (across and within industry), 
where they sort customers’ and suppliers’ industry portfolios by size, and include the 3 
different sized portfolios as controls in the regression. They also utilize size and book-to-
market controls. The Cohen & Frazzini (2008) findings however, show that even after 
controlling for all effects that are known to have predictive power, past customer returns still 
forecast the successive supplier returns.  
2.1.3 Variation in Inattention 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) argue that the customer momentum originates from investor’s 
inability to extract information about the economic links between customers and suppliers. If 
the momentum does come from investor inattention, then varying this inattention should 
have significant effects on the result. They use data on mutual funds holdings extracted from 
CDA/spectrum database3 to proxy inattention. They argue that mutual funds who commonly 
hold both the supplier and the customer stocks have more incentive to gather information on 
the respective parts than an otherwise “single” holder of the supplier or customer stock. 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) run two separate customer momentum strategies, one for a 
portfolio that has a high fraction of COMOWN((# of mutual funds holding both the 
customer and supplier) ÷ (# of mutual funds holding the supplier over the same month)), and 
another portfolio with a low fraction of COMOWN. They find that the portfolio with low 
COMOWN (high inattention) yields an abnormal monthly return of 2.7%, whereas its higher 
counterpart yields a 0.61% a month. Cohen & Frazzini (2008) also provide evidence that 
common managers trade significantly more of supplier stock when news about a customer is 
released into the market. This coupled with the high abnormal return for the low COMOWN 
portfolio strongly supports the hypothesis that the customer momentum results are driven by 
investor inattention.  
                                                
3 CDA/Spectrum is now called Thomson-Reuters Mutual Funds database 
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2.2 Related Research on Economic Links and Predictable 
Returns 
Menzly & Ozbas (2006) use Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output surveys to 
determine industry links, and find significant return predictability amongst industries that 
are related to each other through the supply chain. They find that a trading strategy involving 
buying (selling) industries whose upstream (supplier) industry had the highest (lowest) 
returns, yields an annual abnormal return of 7%. Using related downstream (customer) 
industries instead of upstream yields an annual abnormal return of 6% (Menzly & Ozbas, 
2006). Hong, Tourus & Valkanov (2007) find evidence that returns of certain industry 
portfolios (retail, services, commercial real estate, metal and petroleum) can forecast the US 
stock market by up to 2 months. The same is true for the eight largest stock markets outside 
US. They argue that the predictability stems from investor’s slow reaction to value relevant 
information in industry returns that can significantly affect the stock market (Hong, Torous, 
& Valkanov, 2007). Shahrur, Becker & Rosenfeld (2010) also use the ‘Input-Output 
Benchmark Survey’ of the BEA to determine industry links, and find that a customer-
supplier/lead-lag effect also exists in international markets.  
 
Less research has been performed on customer-supplier links with individual firms, this 
probably due to the tediousness of extracting the individual customer-supplier links and 
merging them with the CRSP database. Funke et al (2010) extend Cohen & Frazzini (2008)’s 
method of finding return-predictability amongst economically linked firms. Where Cohen & 
Frazzini (2008) look at monthly returns, Funke et al (2010) study the effects of extreme one-
day returns, events that should definitely grab investor attention. They conclude that 
attention is only ‘partially limited’, as the customer momentum mainly occurs within the 
first week after the event, doesn’t apply to the largest suppliers and has disappeared (at least 
for negative events) in the more recent past (Funke et al, 2010). This actually make the 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) result seem even stronger, as Funke et al (2010) study the a more 
obvious form of investor attention (extreme one day returns vs monthly high returns).  
 
Findings by Cohen & Frazzini (2008), Funke et al (2010), Menzly & Ozbas(2006), Hong, 
Tourus & Valkanov (2007) and Shahrur, Becker & Rosenfeld (2010) all provide evidence of 
firm/industry level lead-lag effects stemming from customer-supplier relationships. 
Moreover, Kulak & Schmidt (2011) find further evidence of lead-lag effects (customer-
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supplier) and return predictability within the same firm. They suggest that the return 
predictability doesn’t come from investor’s lack of understanding of firm/industry related 
information, rather from investor’s lack of understanding of the economic links in general 
(Kulak & Schmidt, 2011).  
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The anomaly found by Cohen & Frazzini (2008) is very difficult to square with the efficient 
market hypothesis. The EMH suggests that no asset should earn above normal profits 
without taking above normal risks. Any strategy whose returns are left unexplained after 
controlling for traditional risk factors could be considered a violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis. According to Fama (1970), an efficient market is a market in which prices 
always fully reflect available information. 
 
Fama (1970) separates the EMH into three subsets; strong-, semi-strong- and weak -form 
efficient. For the strong form EMH to hold, all private information should be incorporated 
into asset prices. This means that no one, not even insiders should be able to trade on private 
information and achieve abnormal returns. Semi-strong form efficiency means that all 
publically available information should be incorporated into prices. This suggests that all 
information available through financial statements would not allow professional nor 
unprofessional investors to earn above normal returns. Given that the economic links in 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) are fully available in financial reports due to regulation SFAS no. 
131, one could argue that the customer momentum portfolio significantly challenges the 
semi strong form version of EMH. Lastly, the weak form efficiency requires that all past 
prices should be incorporated into asset prices. This would suggest that strategies involving 
price -and earnings momentum should not yield excess returns.  
 
There is a lot of documented evidence suggesting violations of the EMH.  Ang, Goetzmann 
& Schaefer (2010) however argue that a number of studies fail to consider market frictions 
(transaction costs, short selling constraints etc) when proposing anomalies and EMH 
empirical tests. They also argue that the papers fail to represent the behaviour of real 
investors profiting from real trading strategies, as they cannot prove that these investors 
actually profited from such market inefficiencies. In fact, many of the discovered anomalies 
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seem to disappear once an article is published in a financial journal. This would suggest that 
the market is at least somewhat efficient.  
2.4 Asset Pricing Tests and Factor Variables 
2.4.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
A central discussion in finance has been to find risk factors that can explain excess returns. 
First developed by Treynor (1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), the 
Capital Asset Pricing model was created with a purpose of using a market risk factor in order 
to predict and explain stock returns. Given that all other risks could be diversified away, the 
only risk factor necessary to explain asset returns was market risk. It was later suggested that 
the market model, and the corresponding market portfolio was insufficient, and that holding 
other combinations of assets in “non-market portfolios” result in higher reward-to-risk ratios 
than the market portfolio (Ang, Goetzmann, Schaefer, 2010). The model also failed to 
explain several anomalies that were found in the market. Amongst these were the size effect 
(Banz, 1981), the book-to-market effect (Stattman, 1980) and the momentum effect 
(Jagadeesh & Titman, 1993). Multifactor models that build on CAPM have therefore been 
created in order to better explain asset returns in the market.  
2.4.2 Fama & French (1993) 3-Factor Model 
Fama & French (1993) find that the cross-section of average returns of common stock show 
little relation to the CAPM beta. They however find that characteristics and financial ratios 
help explain cross-section of asset returns. They propose a model that includes portfolios 
formed on size (SMB: Small minus Big) and book-to-market (HML: High minus Low) in 
addition to the market portfolio in CAPM:  𝑅!(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑎! + 𝑏! 𝑅𝑀(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑠!𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑡)+ ℎ!𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝑡)+ 𝑒!(𝑡) 
where Ri(t) is the return on asset i for month t, RF(t) is the risk-free rate, RM(t) is the market 
return, SMB(t) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small stocks 
and big stocks, and HML(t) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of 
high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks (Fama & French, 2012). Fama & 
French (1993) run several regressions on the portfolios that they examine and find that the 
intercepts equal 0 after controlling for excess market return, size and B/M.  
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2.4.3 Carhart (1997) 4-factor Model 
Carhart (1997) finds significant evidence for momentum in stock returns, in which they are 
unable to explain using the 3-factor model. Using Fama & French (1993) 3-factor model, 
plus an additional factor that captures the momentum effect of Jagadeesh & Titman (1993), 
yields the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model:  𝑅!(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑎! + 𝑏! 𝑅𝑀(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑠!𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑡)+ ℎ!𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝑡)+ 𝑝!𝑃𝑅1𝑌𝑅(𝑡)+ 𝑒!(𝑡) 
where 𝑃𝑅1𝑌𝑅(𝑡) is the difference between the month t returns on diversified portfolios of 
the winners and losers of the past year. Carhart (1997) finds that the 4-factor model can 
explain considerable amount of variation in stock returns and that it significantly improves 
on the average pricing errors found with CAPM and 3-factor Model.  
2.4.4 Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) 4-factor Model 
Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) find that market-wide liquidity is priced into assets. They find 
that stocks that are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity, experience higher expected returns 
even after controlling for size, value and momentum. The Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) model 
is an augmented version of Fama & French (1993) 3-factor model with an additional 
liquidity factor: 
𝑅!(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑎! + 𝑏! 𝑅𝑀(𝑡)− 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑠!𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑡)+ ℎ!𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝑡)++𝑙!𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡)+ 𝑒!(𝑡) 
where 𝑙!𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡) is the difference between the month t returns on portfolios formed on stocks 
with high predicted sensitivities to liquidity and stocks with low predicted sensitivities to 
liquidity. Not only did Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) find that expected returns are cross-
sectionally related to fluctuations in liquidity, but also found that the liquidity factor 
captured half of the profits in their momentum strategy. This is consistent with the findings 
of Grinblatt & Moskowitz (2004), who find momentum to be strongest in small-cap and 
illiquid stocks.  
2.4.5 Selected Research on Other Asset Pricing Factors 
 Leverage 
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Modigliani & Miller (1958) present in their proposition II, that firm leverage has a positive 
effect on returns due to the increased risk for equity holders. Building on this, Muradoglu & 
Sivaprasad (2010) provide evidence that a leverage factor captures firms’ sensitivities to 
risk. Their leverage factor, HLMLL (high leverage minus low leverage) is added to Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor model, and conclude that their 5-factor model best explains variation in asset 
returns. Using a sample of UK firms from 1980-2008, they find that low-leveraged stocks 
are negatively related to asset returns, whereas high leveraged stocks to be positively related 
to asset returns (Muradoglu & Sivaprasad, 2010). Other research also suggest, in 
contradiction to MM.II, that leverage is negatively related to returns (Penman, Richardson 
and Tuna, 2007 and George and Hwang, 2010). George & Hwang (2010) suggest that if the 
cost of financial distress is expensive, then high (low) leveraged firms tend to be less (more) 
sensitive to systematic distress risk. They argue that distress costs heighten exposure to 
systematic risk, and suggest that firms with high distress costs choose low leverage, which 
causes this negative correlation (George & Hwang, 2010).  
Operating Leverage 
Novy-Marx (2011) links operating leverage to asset returns. He finds operating leverage to 
predict cross-sectional returns, and finds that portfolios formed by sorting on operating 
leverage generate abnormal excess returns. Novy-Marx (2011) shows that firms with high 
operating leverage earn significantly higher average returns than firms with low operating 
leverage. He argues that production cost could leave a firm’s assets with just as much 
exposure to economic risks as debt service (leverage). In this way, operating leverage could 
be considered a significant risk factor in asset pricing.  
 Industries 
An interesting topic in asset pricing is also whether industries play a role in explaining asset 
returns. Chou, Ho & Ko (2012) find significant evidence that asset pricing models fail to 
explain variation in industry returns. Specifically, they find that asset pricing anomalies, 
including the small-firm effect, the BM effect, and the momentum effect, all relate to 
industry classifications. 
Investment 
Cooper, Gulen & Schill (2009) document a strong negative relationship between growth in 
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assets and stock returns. Specifically, they find a yearly return spread between low  -and 
high investment stocks of 20%. Moreover, they find asset growth rate to predict asset returns 
in both small –and large cap stocks. They argue that the premium is too large to be able to 
console with traditional risk-based explanations. Aharoni, Grundy & Zeng (2012) also find 
evidence of investment being a central predictor of asset returns. Specifically, they find 
evidence suggesting that returns and expected investment at the firm level is negatively 
related. By firm level investment they mean asset growth rather than per-share growth 
(Aharoni, Grundy & Zeng, 2012).  Fama & French (2014) find a similar result by 
investigating both growth of assets and growth of book equity, but find portfolios sorted on 
growth of assets produce a larger spread in average returns than using book equity.  
Profitability 
Recent studies have shown a significant relationship between profitability and asset prices. 
Novy-Marx (2013) finds profitable firms to generate significantly higher returns than non-
profitable firms. He generates positive abnormal excess returns by performing a trading 
strategy that involves purchasing (shorting) stocks that have high (low) gross-profitability 
between 1963 and 2010 (Novy-Marx, 2013). These findings are also confirmed by Fama & 
French (2014) who find operating profitability4 to be correlated with asset returns. Moreover, 
Hou, Xue & Zhang (2012) form portfolios based on return on equity, and find that high 
profitability stocks is associated with higher return (where the reverse is also true). This view 
is supported by Wang & Yu (2013) who find a monthly profitability premium using ROE of 
0.98%. They find that risk only plays a moderate role in the profitability premium, but find 
strong evidence for the investor attention channel of Hong & Stein (1999). Specifically, they 
find that investors underreact to news about profitability, causing high (low) profitability 
firms to be underpriced (overpriced) (Wang & Yu, 2013).  
Profitability is quite a puzzling issue. According to EMH, no one should gain any additional 
return without taking additional risk. For the other factors mentioned above, risk can at least 
partly explain the why there is an asset premium. The problem with profitability however, is 
that there is no clear relationship between risk and profitability. Profitable firms have a 
tendency to be of higher quality and have better competitive advantages than non-profitable 
                                                
4 Operating profitability is calculated by Fama & French (2014) as (EBIT-Interests Expenses)/Book Equity. Further analysis 
of operating profitability will be conducted without interest expenses.  
 17 
firms, and should therefore not compensate you for any additional risk-taking (Bryan, 2013).  
2.4.6 Fama & French (2014) 5-Factor Model 
Several research papers have been conducted on whether the classic asset pricing models 
such as F&F 3-Factor and Carhart 4-factor, are good enough in explaining asset returns. 
Motivated by Novy-Marx (2013)’s findings of profitability premium and Aharoni, Grundy & 
Zeng (2012)’s asset growth premium, Fama & French (2014) present a five-factor model that 
includes two additional variables that captures the profitability -and investment effect.  𝑅! 𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹 𝑡 = 𝑎! + 𝑏! 𝑅𝑀 𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹 𝑡 + 𝑠!𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝑡 + ℎ!𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑡 + 𝑟!𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝑡+ 𝑐!𝐶𝑀𝐴(𝑡) 
where 𝑟!𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝑡  is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks 
with robust and weak profitability, and 𝑐!𝐶𝑀𝐴(𝑡) is the difference between the returns on 
diversified portfolios of low(conservative) and high(aggressive) investment stocks. Fama & 
French (2014) find significant evidence that profitability and asset growth is correlated to 
asset returns. The model is useful in describing asset returns in applied cases, however is 
rejected in all GRS5 tests. This has implications for asset pricing, as the model doesn’t fully 
reflect variation in asset returns. The model is however acceptable at explaining variation in 
portfolios formed on size and a couple of portfolios formed on B/M, Operating profitability 
and investment (Fama & French, 2014).  
Another interesting finding in their paper, is that their factor loading HML is actually found 
redundant, as its high average return is fully captured by its exposures to the other variables 
(Fama & French, 2014). Specifically, they find that the value premium is mostly absorbed by 
the investment and profitability factors. Fama & French (2014) therefore find that a four-
factor model that excludes HML performs just as well as the five-factor model. A five-factor 
model is however useful if one wants to evaluate whether a portfolio return is related to 
investment, value -and profitability premiums.   
                                                
5 GRS statisic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) tests the efficiency of portfolios. 
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2.5 Selected Research on Limited attention & Information 
Diffusion 
Traditional asset pricing is based on the notion that the market is efficient. Any new 
information should immediately be processed in the market and subsequently be 
incorporated into prices. Selected research in psychology and finance however, suggests that 
investors are slow at processing information, creating delays in stock price reactions. With 
the vast amount of information available in the market, investors need to be selective with 
how they process this information. Kahneman (1973) finds that in order for people to 
allocate their attention towards a specific task, it would require them to reduce their attention 
from other tasks. In this way, attention is a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman, 1973).  
2.5.1 Theoretical Research 
Theoretical frameworks emerged as a result of discussions on investor’s informational 
capacity constraints. Merton (1987) was one of the first to create a model that incorporates 
investor inattention and incomplete information. The key behavioural assumption in his 
capital market equilibrium model is that an investor will only add a security to his portfolio 
if he knows about that specific security. When some stocks gets neglected by the market, he 
suggests that a small subset of investors will try to take advantage of this, and hence take 
large undiversified positions in those neglected stocks. As a reward for the increased risk, 
investors will earn high subsequent expected returns (Merton, 1987).  
Hong & Stein (1999) employ a gradual information diffusion model that unifies both 
underreaction and overreaction by looking at the interaction between two types of market 
participants, namely news-watchers and momentum traders. First, they assume that private 
information diffuses slowly across the news-watchers population, causing underreaction. A 
second group of traders will try to exploit this and create excessive momentum in stock 
returns, which eventually culminates into overreaction  (Hong & Stein, 1999). In this way, 
they suggest that both overreaction and underreaction stems from gradual diffusion of 
information.  
Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003) analyze how a change in accounting disclosure policies affect 
asset prices in the presence of limited attention and where investors have informational 
processing constraints. They argue that investors can have very different perceptions on 
informational equivalent accounting disclosures if they change the presentation of the 
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disclosures (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). For instance, investors might perceive information 
disclosed in the income statement as more important than if it was listed as additional item in 
footnotes, even though they contain the same information.  
2.5.2 Empirical Research 
Investor Attention & Information Diffusion 
There is a vast amount of empirical literature and evidence on slow diffusion of information 
and investor inattention. Huberman & Regev (2001) study the effect of re-releasing 
information in the market that has previously been published. They specifically study the 
stock price reaction of ENMD (a biotech firm) after releasing a negative piece of information 
in the New York Times that has previously been reported in ‘Nature’ (a scientific journal) 
five months earlier. The stock price soared on the re-releasing in the Times, even though the 
information was not at all new.  
 
Barber & Odean (2008) find that individual investors display attention driven buying 
behaviour, and find they are net buyers on high volume days, and when stocks are in the 
news. Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) measure investor attention using search frequency in 
Google, and find that an increase in this frequency can predict stock prices in the following 
two weeks. Hirshleifer et al (2004) study the effect of net operating assets (NOA) on future 
stock returns, and find the relationship between NOA and future returns to be negatively 
related. They suggest that an increase in NOA6 could raise doubts about future profitability, 
as the firm accumulates accounting earnings without accumulating free cash flow. As 
investors tend to react positively (negatively) to increases (decreases) in NOA, when the 
long run sustainability of performance could suggest otherwise, Hirshleifer et al (2004) 
argue that limited attention causes investors to misperceive information contained in NOA. 
 
Several studies have shown that investors fail to consider valuable information from related 
firms. Ramnath (2002) finds that investors don’t fully incorporate information retrieved from 
an industry’s first earnings announcements to the subsequent announcements of related 
firms. As a result, this underreaction will generate return predictability for the following 
announcers. Moreover, Kovacs (2009) suggests that underreaction to industry specific 
                                                
6 Where Net Operating Assets (NOA) = Operating Earnings – Free Cash Flow  
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information contributes to the post earnings announcement drift. Specifically, earnings-
announcements from peer firms that arrive after the firm’s own earnings-announcement 
strongly influence a firm’s post earnings announcement drift, as the information from peers 
contain value relevant industry information. The effect however is only present when the 
peer earnings surprises confirm the firm’s initial earnings surprise, and in industries that 
exhibit contagion type intra-industry info transfers. Hou (2007) finds that within an industry, 
big firms lead small firms, and that this lead-lag effect stems from information diffusion. 
Specifically, smaller stocks react slowly to industry relevant information from larger firms. 
The effect however seems to be more pronounced in less competitive –and concentrated 
industries, and to largely originate from the slow response of small firms to negative news of 
larger firms. 
Dellavigna & Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim & Teoh (2009) study the reduced stock 
price reaction of earnings announcements on days that investors are assumed to be 
inattentive. Dellavigna & Pollet (2009) find that earnings announcements reactions of 
Fridays are significantly smaller than on other weekdays. Moreover, Hirshleifer, Lim & 
Teoh (2009) find weaker reactions to a firm’s earnings announcements, when other firms 
make a number of same day earnings announcements.  
Two common anomalies that are difficult to explain by traditional asset pricing models and 
that are often linked to limited attention are the post earnings announcement drift (earnings-
momentum) and momentum in asset returns. Bernard & Thomas (1989) was one of the first 
to link earnings momentum to information diffusion and investor attention. Of more recent 
research is Hou, Peng & Xiong (2009), who examine investor attention with respect to both 
earnings –and price momentum. They find that investors tend to underreact to earnings 
announcements, causing earnings momentum. Moreover, due to behavioural biases 
(overconfidence and extrapolative expectations), they find that investors generate price 
overreaction, which in return could explain price momentum in stock returns. Hong, Lim & 
Stein (1999) find momentum to be more pronounced amongst small stocks and stocks with 
less analyst coverage.  
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3. Data 
In order to examine the fundamental differences between customers and suppliers, I have to 
have a file that actually links the customers with the suppliers. The file utilized in this paper 
was provided by Jarrad Harford, who is currently working on a paper with Schonlau and 
Stainfield about the value impact of economic links in relation to M&A activity. The file 
includes information about customer/supplier links from 1990-2009. Harford, Schonlau and 
Stainfield (2013) extracted information about suppliers’ respective customers through the 
Compustat database. Information however, is limited to the largest customers, as firms are 
only required to report the identity of customers responsible more than 10% of overall sales, 
profits or losses (Harford, Schonlau & Stainfield, 2013). Some of the customer names 
reported in Compustat appear only in an abbreviated form, and they utilize a code-based 
matching algorithm to identify the correct customer (Harford, Schonlau & Stainfield, 2013). 
With a complete list of customer and supplier gvkeys and their links, I proceed by extracting 
yearly accounting information on customers and suppliers from January 1990 to December 
2009 from the CRSP/Compustat merged database (CCM) and import it into Stata. The CCM 
file contains all firms (inactive or active) listed on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq.  
Some observations in the ‘Links’7 dataset have missing customer gvkeys, and in order to be 
able to study unique customer-supplier relationships, the supplier firms with missing 
customer information are dropped from the dataset. Following this I prepare the 
‘Fundamentals’ dataset to make it ready for being merged with the information about 
customer/supplier links. Checking for duplicates in ‘Fundamentals’, I find several 
observations to be repeated twice8, and therefore drop all observations whose gvkey and 
fyear are duplicates. I proceed by performing two 1:m merges in Stata using ‘Fundamentals’ 
dataset as the master set, and supplier (customer) gvkey and fyear as key variables to be 
identified. The ‘Links’ dataset is then the ‘using’ data set for these merges. For the first 
merge I use ‘Fundamentals’ dataset and supplier information. I delete all observations whose 
match is not successful (both those in the using dataset (code 2) and the master dataset (code 
                                                
7 The original dataset from Jarrad Harford, now referred to as ’Links’, and the CCM datatset referred to as ’Fundamentals’ 
8 Due to change of reporting dates in Compustat 
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1)). I further create a dummy variable named supplier, which is equal to 1 if the firm is listed 
as a supplier firm and 0 otherwise. After dropping all matches not coded (3), all observations 
will contain a supplier dummy variable equal to 1.  
The second merge is also performed using ‘Fundamentals’ dataset, but using customer 
information. I delete all observations that are from the using dataset only (code (2)), but keep 
the observations from the master data. Similarly to the first merge, I create a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is listed as a customer in the dataset. 
Following the merges, I append the two merged Stata files. In order for the append to be 
successful, I make sure that the names of the variables that have the same definitions in the 
two datasets, are labelled identically (i.e. crsp_cust_name and crsp_supplier_name to 
crsp_name). The dataset now contains information on whether they are listed as customers 
and/or suppliers and their respective information about fundamentals. 
In the situation where the firm is listed as a customer and a supplier, there will be two 
observations containing the same information about fundamentals, but differ with respect to 
information contained in certain variables such as Supplier and Customer. Where one 
observation comes from the first merge and has a Supplier value equal to 1, the other comes 
from the second merge and has a Customer value equal to 1, i.e: 
Table 1.  
Gvkey Fyear Conm Supplier Customer Cust_Gvkey 
1446 1992 American Exploration 
Co 
1 0 . 
1446 1992 American Exploration 
Co 
0 1 6127 
In order for the observations to be copied into one line, I utilize a code9 that copies 
information from one “duplicate” to the other, causing the two lines to be perfect duplicates: 
Table 2. 
Gvkey Fyear Conm Supplier Customer Cust_Gvkey 
1446 1992 American Exploration 
Co 
1 1 6127 
                                                
9 bysort gvkey fyear : replace Variable = Variable[3 - _n] if missing(Variable) & _N == 2. 
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1446 1992 American Exploration 
Co 
1 1 6127 
After combining the information from the two lines, I proceed by dropping all perfect 
duplicates, so that there is only one observation for each gvkey and fyear, which includes 
dummy variables stating whether the firm is a customer, a supplier or both. Moreover, since 
the unidentified firms do not provide any useful information for the analysis, I delete all 
observations where the firms are neither listed as a customer nor a supplier.  
In order to explore differences in industries, I download details on Kenneth French’s 12 
industry factors10, and create 12 dummy variables based on SIC codes. The supplier and 
customer firms are then assigned to one of 12 industries based on its 4-digit SIC code 
extracted from CCM.  
The final dataset now contains accounting information from 1990-2009, details on whether 
firms are listed as customers and/or suppliers, and information about industries.  
                                                
10 Dowloaded from Kenneth French Website:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html , For details see Appendix 
Table A.1. 
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4. Fundamental Information and Key Statistics 
4.1 Comparing Customers & Suppliers along a Set of Variables 
With accounting information linked to the firm gvkey’s and dummy variables suggesting 
whether the firm is a supplier or a customer, I calculate several key variables known to be 
related to empirical asset pricing. The variables I consider are size, B/M  (with and without 
goodwill), profitability ratios (ROA, ROE, Gross Profitability and Operating Profitability), 
leverage ratio and operating leverage.  
Table 3. Definitions 
Size Log(Size)  
B/M (Total Assets – Intangibles - Current Liabilities- Long 
Term Debt) / Market Value 
B/M1 (Total Assets – Intangibles – Goodwill - Current 
Liabilities - Long term debt) / Market Value 
ROA Net Income / Total Assets 
ROE Net Income / Book Value of Equity 
Gross Profitability (Sales - COGS) / Total Assets 
Operating Profitability (using Total Assets) 11 (Sales – COGS - SG&A) / Total Assets  
Operating Profitability (using Book Equity) (Sales - COGS- SG&A) / Book Value of Equity 
Operating Leverage SG&A / Total Assets 
Leverage Ratio (Current Liabilities + Long Term Debt) / Total Assets 
 
I do the above steps in order to observe whether customers and suppliers differ 
fundamentally. The variables above are all found to be related to asset returns, and they are 
useful in order to see whether a systematic difference between customers and suppliers could 
be related to asset pricing. The output shows some interesting results, especially with respect 
to profitability.  
                                                
11 Use operating profitability as suggested by Fama & French (2014), yet without interest expenses (too many values 
missing from CRSP/Compustat).  
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Table 4. Averages of Firm Key Statistics (Averages of Each Group Individually) 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All Firms 
Size 5.000*** 7.961*** 5.925*** 
 (389.11) (407.46) (436.07) 
N 23781 12428 33702 
BM 1.043*** 1.247*** 1.119*** 
 (15.79) (23.04) (22.18) 
N 23589 12338 33687 
BM1 0.915*** 1.128*** 0.994*** 
 (13.88) (20.54) (19.68) 
N 23589 12338 33432 
Gross Profitability 0.322*** 0.348*** 0.332*** 
 (144.96) (141.27) (186.53) 
N 23770 12423 33687 
Op. Profitability (Total Assets) 0.0470*** 0.126*** 0.0704*** 
 (17.62) (88.63) (35.46) 
N 20835 10279 28876 
Op. Profitability (Book Equity)  0.0799*** 0.173*** 0.108*** 
 (4.70) (11.60) (8.16) 
N 20772 10237 28776 
ROA -0.0828*** 0.0162*** -0.0517*** 
 (-20.15) (9.38) (-17.50) 
N 23769 12424 33687 
ROE -0.139*** -0.00228*** -0.0969*** 
 (-3.70) (-0.10) (-3.48) 
N 23697 12365 33562 
Leverage Ratio 0.217*** 0.253*** 0.228*** 
 (130.61) (140.03) (173.50) 
N 23709 12369 33577 
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Op. Leverage 0.333*** 0.278*** 0.320*** 
 (112.66) (120.30) (141.55) 
N 20835 10279 28876 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The table shows that the average profitability measures (ROA, ROE, Op.Profitability) and 
size is significantly different from customers to suppliers, so an interesting thing to check is 
whether this difference stays constant throughout time. Using ROA, operating profitability 
and size, I generate a table of means and medians from 1990 to 2009: 
Table 5. ROA, Operating Proftiability & Size Over Time 
 
ROA Operating Profitability Size 
 
Supplier Customer Supplier Customer Supplier Customer 
fyear Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1990 -0.0588 0.0332 0.0213 0.0439 0.0277 0.0970 0.1320 0.1346 3.3036 3.3613 6.7593 6.7503 
1991 -0.0366 0.0224 0.0283 0.0320 0.0737 0.1061 0.1374 0.1348 4.1560 3.9118 7.3750 7.5239 
1992 -0.0390 0.0306 0.0231 0.0357 0.0696 0.1173 0.1437 0.1392 4.2440 4.0159 7.2199 7.3757 
1993 -0.0472 0.0293 0.0178 0.0353 0.0739 0.1145 0.1305 0.1323 4.2976 4.0469 7.1926 7.3285 
1994 -0.0523 0.0374 0.0366 0.0453 0.0750 0.1195 0.1425 0.1468 4.3630 4.1308 7.2032 7.3206 
1995 -0.0334 0.0337 0.0286 0.0414 0.0868 0.1177 0.1423 0.1466 4.4618 4.2501 7.3321 7.3298 
1996 -0.0834 0.0319 0.0289 0.0447 0.0511 0.1164 0.1292 0.1376 4.5419 4.2960 7.3826 7.3871 
1997 -0.0950 0.0279 0.0122 0.0404 0.0383 0.1183 0.1235 0.1403 4.6036 4.4075 7.5800 7.5846 
1998 -0.1015 0.0136 0.0106 0.0326 0.0354 0.1035 0.1202 0.1310 4.7215 4.5150 7.6410 7.6228 
1999 -0.0749 0.0168 0.0150 0.0401 0.0274 0.0875 0.1112 0.1351 4.9602 4.7563 7.8612 7.9338 
2000 -0.1419 0.0098 -0.0132 0.0352 0.0151 0.0946 0.1018 0.1274 5.2053 5.0443 8.0071 8.0263 
2001 -0.2114 -0.0206 -0.0517 0.0206 -0.0259 0.0659 0.0943 0.1137 5.2038 5.0460 8.1014 8.1230 
2002 -0.1818 -0.0063 -0.0208 0.0261 -0.0003 0.0781 0.1098 0.1189 5.2978 5.2154 8.3436 8.4055 
2003 -0.0888 0.0176 0.0213 0.0368 0.0352 0.0848 0.1234 0.1240 5.4260 5.3294 8.4988 8.5577 
2004 -0.0457 0.0300 0.0329 0.0464 0.0586 0.0954 0.1346 0.1307 5.5520 5.4113 8.5802 8.6376 
2005 -0.0329 0.0323 0.0429 0.0505 0.0665 0.1004 0.1367 0.1367 5.7024 5.5404 8.6369 8.6479 
2006 -0.0601 0.0329 0.0383 0.0532 0.0572 0.0982 0.1343 0.1334 5.8363 5.7570 8.6714 8.7102 
2007 -0.0522 0.0275 0.0410 0.0509 0.0492 0.0970 0.1325 0.1363 5.9337 5.8559 8.8655 8.8671 
2008 -0.1249 0.0138 -0.0009 0.0413 0.0457 0.1029 0.1318 0.1360 6.0247 5.9443 8.9495 8.9131 
2009 -0.0755 0.0102 0.0189 0.0325 0.0577 0.0890 0.1210 0.1215 6.1225 6.0336 9.2332 9.2482 
Total -0.0828 0.0229 0.0162 0.0395 0.0470 0.1020 0.1264 0.1333 4.9997 4.8150 7.9619 8.0362 
 
The table above shows that the difference in ROA, operating profitability and size between 
customers and suppliers stays more or less constant throughout time. The larger average size 
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of the customer relative to the supplier does however make economic sense, and can be 
partly explained by the data generating process. A supplier firm is only required to report the 
identity of customers representing more than 10% of annual sales. Given that the customer 
needs to represent a big chunk of annual sales, it is more likely to identify a firm of a larger 
size than otherwise (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). The difference in profitability however is 
more of a puzzling issue. Profitability shouldn’t (on average) differ much from whether the 
firm is a customer or supplier. Given this, I want to discuss two possible explanations to the 
differences in profitability, namely industries and size.  
4.2 Industries as a Factor Explaining Profitability 
Table 5 shows that the difference in profitability stays more or less constant over time. It is 
also well known that one should be careful in comparing profitability measures across 
different industries. Some industries may be more asset-intensive, requiring them to have 
large storage houses and a large portfolio of machinery. As an example, the energy sector 
(below listed as Enrgy) would require a lot of assets, whereas telecom (Telecm) might 
require less.  It is therefore interesting to see whether customers and suppliers tend to operate 
in different industries. If customers are highly concentrated in one industry, whereas 
suppliers are concentrated in another, this could in return, explain the difference in 
profitability between customers and suppliers.  
Figure 1. Fraction of Same Industry Customer/Supplier Links for Different 
Industries 
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Figure 1 demonstrates whether linked customers and suppliers operate within the same 
industry. As we can see, only a small fraction of customer/supplier relationships are within 
industry. The above figure displays the unique customer/supplier relationships, and as a 
result will contain cases where a firm is listed as a customer to several suppliers. I therefore 
wish to visualize how customers and suppliers differ with respect to industry concentration 
in general, irrespective of whether they are linked or not.  
Figure 2. Fraction of Number of Observations in Each Industry12 
 
As seen in Figure 2, there is a moderate difference between customers and suppliers with 
respect to industry concentration. First, there are cases where customers & suppliers are very 
similar, i.e Energy, Chemicals, Money, Health13. There are other cases however, where they 
are very different. Where almost 30% of the customer observations stems from shops, 
utilities and telecom, the same industries only stand for about 8% in supplier firms. 
Moreover, 43% of the supplier firms are concentrated in manufacturing and business 
equipment. The same industries only represent about 28% of the customer observations. 
ROA and Operating Profitability however, even differ significantly within industries. Take 
the Business Equipment sector as an example. This industry represents 30% of all supplier 
                                                
12 Ken French 12 Industry Portfolios. NoDur: Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys. 
Durbl: Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances. Manuf: Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, 
Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing. Enrgy: Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products. Chems: Chemicals and Allied 
Products. BusEq: Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment. Telcm: Telephone and 
Television Transmission. Utils: Utilities. Shops: Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops). Hlth: 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs. Money: Finance. Other: Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus 
Serv, Entertainment 
13 Some of the colours in Figure 2 are difficult to seperate. The list starts with NoDur, and will move clock-wise from there.  
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observations and 19% of all customer firms. Both the average ROA and operating 
profitability however, differs significantly from whether it is a supplier or a customer firm: 
Table 6. Profitability for Business Equipment Industry 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.139*** -0.0257*** -0.117*** 
 (-16.29) (-3.89) (-16.25) 
N 7235 2379 8786 
Op. Profitability 0.000401 0.100*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.08) (26.15) (4.49) 
N 6969 2310 8462 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
As one can see above, there is an 11.3% (10%) difference in ROA (Op. Profitability) 
between customer –and supplier firms in the Business Equipment industry. This however, is 
not at all unique. Health (represents healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs) stands for 
10% of customer observations, and 12% of supplier observations. The difference in ROA 
(Op. Profitability) between customers and suppliers is now 21.6% (11%).  
Table 7. Profitability for Health Industry 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.219*** -0.00323 -0.162*** 
 (-21.55) (-0.49) (-20.34) 
N 2859 1264 3828 
Op. Profitability -0.0315*** 0.141*** 0.0231*** 
 (-3.91) (24.08) (3.74) 
N 1845 1007 2610 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The table above shows some interesting results. Profitability seems to be very different from 
supplier -to customer firms, irrespective of whether they are in the same industries. In fact, 
this is true in all industries but utilities, where ROA is actually very similar between 
customers and suppliers (see Table A.2 in Appendix). The evidence above suggests that the 
difference in profitability cannot be explained by industry concentration.  
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4.3 Size as a Factor Explaining Profitability 
An interesting observation is that measures of profitability for customers and suppliers 
change when you move down the income statement. Table 4 shows that gross profitability is 
only moderately different from customers to suppliers, while there is a large difference for 
operating profitability, ROA and ROE. I therefore want to propose a suggestion that the 
difference in profitability between customers and suppliers actually contain a size effect. As 
we already know from Table 4 the average size of the customer is much larger than the 
average size of the supplier. Looking more closely at operating profitability given all firms, 
supplier firms, and customers firms across different averages, one can see that larger firms 
do outperform smaller firms in terms of profitability.  
Table 8. Average Operating Profitability Given Size and Group 
  Operating Profitability 
 All Firms  Supplier  Customer 
 Above or below Average Size  
Above or below Average 
Size  
Above or below Average 
Size 
 (Size<5.9) (Size>5.9)  (Size<5.0) (Size>5.0)  (Size<7.9) (Size>7.9) 
Op. 
Profitability 
0.0182*** 
(5.27) 
0.1354*** 
(167.05) 
 
-0.0100* 
(-2.13) 
0.115*** 
(95.14) 
 
0.112*** 
(45.03) 
0.142*** 
(125.77) 
N 16022 12854  11367 9468  5421 4858 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
In the table above, I compare operating profitability given the average size of each group, 
and find that there is some sort of size effect with respect to profitability. While there is less 
of an effect in the customer group (where the average size is very high), the effect is stronger 
for ‘all firms’ and ‘supplier firms’ groups. In these groups, there is a clear difference in 
profitability for smaller and larger firms. These findings are consistent with Hou & van Dijik 
(2010) who find that small firms experience negative shocks to their profitability while big 
firms experience positive shocks from 1984-2005 (before 1984 it was non-existent). They 
argue that this is due to the change in industry market structure (trade liberalization & 
industrial deregulation) in the 80s-90s, and that smaller firms have been especially slow -and 
found it especially challenging to cope with these structural changes. Moreover, they argue 
that it could stem from the “new lists” effect by Fama & French (2004), where there was a 
dramatic increase in newly listed firms in the 80s-90s, whose profitability and survival rate 
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declined sharply.  
Above we saw that operating profitability vary by size. As mentioned earlier, there is a large 
difference between operating -and gross profitability. Selling, general and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) is the only value that differs between these two measures. The table below 
shows that SG&A does represent a larger fraction of total assets in supplier firms than in 
customer firms:  
Table 9. Average Operating Leverage 
 
Supplier  Customer 
SG&A/Total Assets 
0.333*** 
(112.66) 
0.278*** 
(120.30) 
N 20835 10279 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The results are similar to Table 4 and suggest that operating leverage is consistently larger 
for suppliers than for customers. Furthermore, if these operating costs are truly fixed, then 
results should be even stronger when splitting the sample by size. Looking at the average 
operating leverage above and below the average size of the three groups, I find support that 
SG&A is greater for smaller firms than larger firms.  
Table 10. Average Operating Leverage Given Size and Group 
  Average SG&A/AT 
 All Firms  Supplier  Customer 
 (Size<5.9) (Size>5.9)  (Size<5.0) (Size>5.0)  (Size<7.9) (Size>7.9) 
SG&A/ 
Tot. 
Assets 
0.402*** 
(107.30) 
0.217*** 
(137.74) 
 
0.438*** 
(87.64) 
0.206*** 
(118.48) 
 
0.344*** 
(94.89) 
0.203*** 
(88.27) 
N 16022 12854  11367 9468  5417 4862 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
This difference in SG&A is consistent with the presence of economies of scale. Larger firms 
might be able to spread these costs across a larger production volume and across divisions. 
Even though economies of scale most often refer to production (specialized labour, fixed 
costs spread over large quantities etc), it might be that larger firms receive discounts on other 
items nonrelated to production but related to SG&A. Examples of this could be electricity, 
audit expenses, and office building rents. Moreover, a large firm might experience 
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economies of scale by having some services in office, i.e legal department. Some of these 
firms might even be so large due to M&A activity that could have been motivated by 
economies of scale in itself.  
The above discussions display some interesting results. Profitability differs significantly 
from customers to suppliers. While this difference in profitability cannot explain the 
customer momentum anomaly directly, it still points to systematic differences between the 
two groups of firms. In the next two sections, the analysis will focus on profitability in 
general, irrespective on whether customer firms on average have higher profitability than 
supplier firms. I will in these sections link profitability to the customer momentum returns of 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008).  
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5. Profitability, a Factor Explaining Customer 
Momentum? 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find that the correlation between customers and suppliers spans 
beyond stock returns and moves into real quantities as well. They utilize supplier –and 
customer (lagged) operating income and sales, and find these figures to be much more 
correlated in periods where customers and suppliers are linked (customer represents more 
than 10% of sales) versus not linked. They find that the correlation of customer to supplier 
operating income increases by 38.7% -and the correlation of customer to supplier sales 
increases by 51.4%, when they are linked (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). 
We know that there is correlation between customers and suppliers in terms of revenues and 
operating income. If one holds total assets constant, it is also likely that customers and 
suppliers are correlated in terms of profitability. I will in the next two sections perform two 
analyses that tests whether customers and suppliers are related in terms of profitability.  
5.1 Correlation between customer –and supplier profitability 
In order to check whether customers and suppliers are correlated in terms of profitability, I 
take a random sample of 60 customer/supplier relationships that have non-missing 
profitability measures of at least 5 consecutive years. For each customer/supplier 
relationship, I calculate the correlation between customer profitability (both operating and 
gross profitability) at time (t) and supplier profitability at time (t) and (t+1). The additional 
inclusion of (t+1) is related to the fact that the reaction of supplier profitability to customer 
profitability might not occur instantaneously. I proceed by calculating the average 
correlation of the 60 relationships and get the following output:  
Table 11. Correlation between Customer -and Supplier Gross Profitability 
 
Supplier Gross Profitability at 
Time (t) 
Supplier Gross Profitability at 
Time  (t+1) 
Customer Gross Profitability at Time (t) 0.17261575 0.089837129 
N 60 60 
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Table 12. Correlation between Customer -and Supplier Operating Profitability 
 
Supplier Op. Profitability at    
Time (t) 
Supplier Op. Profitability at   
Time  (t+1) 
Customer Op. Profitability at  Time (t) 0.220348531 0.053754925 
N 60 60 
All of the cases show a slight positive correlation, however the above table also displays 
some very interesting results. First, in both cases, the correlation is significantly reduced 
when using lags. This is in contradiction to my predictions, as one wouldn’t expect customer 
profitability to have an instantaneous effect on supplier profitability. The result could 
indicate that the reaction to supplier profitability happens faster, i.e after 3 or 6 months. 
Second, the correlation is stronger for operating profitability than gross profitability. This is 
also a bit surprising, as one would expect there to be a stronger relationship between 
customers and suppliers with respect to gross profitability. For instance, an increase in 
SG&A in customer firm shouldn’t necessarily influence the SG&A expenses in the supplier 
firm. It could be however, that customer operating profitability at time (t) might affect 
supplier gross profitability at time (t+1). In fact, the correlation is actually the highest when 
comparing the other cases with supplier profitability at (t+1). 
Table 13. Correlation Between Customer Op. Profitability at Time (t) with Supplier 
Gross Profitability at Time  (t+1) 
 
Supplier Gross Profitability at Time (t+1) 
Customer Op. Profitability at Time  (t) 0.195307754 
N 60 
 
If a customer firm experiences a reduction in operating profitability, it is more likely that this 
effect will influence supplier gross profitability than operating profitability, as it is less likely 
that supplier SG&A expenses is correlated with customer profitability. Overall the analysis 
shows that customer –and supplier profitability is correlated. Even though the correlation is 
weak when looking at future reactions of supplier profitability, it could be necessary to look 
at major shocks in order to find a causal relationship. The next section will look at cases 
where customers have experienced a profitability shock and how this might affect supplier 
profitability a year later.  
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5.2 Sample of profitability shocks 
Given that the above analysis failed at finding significant correlation between customer 
profitability at time (t) and supplier profitability at time (t+1), I investigate whether there 
could be a stronger relationship if using profitability shocks. The logic for using profitability 
shocks is that it is more likely that customer profitability will influence supplier profitability 
if there is a large change in customer profitability. A 5% change in customer profitability is 
less likely to affect supplier profitability than if there was to be a shock of i.e. 40%.  For the 
analysis, I take a sample of 60 cases where the customer has had a shock to their gross 
profitability measure, and look at how this might affect supplier gross profitability at time 
(t+1). For this analysis, I utilize gross profitability as Novy-Marx (2013) considers it to be 
the cleanest measure of accounting profitability. Moreover it is more likely to extract a 
causal relationship between customers and suppliers using gross profitability, since operating 
profitability includes a factor that shouldn’t affect supplier profitability as a result of 
customer profitability shock (i.e SG&A).  
The sample selection procedure is based on the following steps. First, I consider a shock to a 
customer’s profitability to be an absolute change of more/less than 20%. The change from 
year to year is calculated as the absolute difference in gross profitability between time (t+1) 
and (t)14. I utilize a one-year lag between customer –and supplier gross-profitability, as it is 
less likely that a profitability shock to a customer causes an instantaneous effect on the 
supplier. I further require there to be a reported link of at least one year prior -and one year 
post the customer shock in order to increase the chances of the customer having an effect on 
supplier profitability. This will hence require there to be a reported link of at least three 
consecutive years.  
As an example, I have provided a table below that shows an output of a particular customer 
firm (customer dummy equal to 1), and its respective supplier (supplier dummy equal to 1). I 
would in this situation require that the firm has one observation listed as a customer before a 
shock occurs (here 1991), and also a year after (1993). The change in gross profitability is 
calculated as the absolute difference between gross profitability in year 1991 to 1992. I am 
then interested in whether this has an effect on its supplier one year after the shock. We are 
                                                
14 Δ Gross profitability= gross profitability (t+1) – gross profitability(t) 
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hence interested in the difference in gross profitability of the supplier firm from 1992 to 
1993.  
Table 14. Example of a Profitability Shock using FEDEX and Air T Inc 
gvkey fyear supplier customer firm name gross_profitability Δ gross_profitability 
4598 2001 0 1 FEDEX Corp .1837533 -0.0014538 
4598 2002 0 1 FEDEX Corp .3899902 .206237 
4598 2003 0 1 FEDEX Corp .3477057 -.0422846 
1210 2001 1 0 Air T Inc .5318517 .1084472 
1210 2002 1 0 Air T Inc .3720461 -.1598056 
1210 2003 1 0 Air T Inc .6060591 .2340129 
1210 2004 1 0 Air T Inc .5174416 -.0886174 
1210 2005 1 0 Air T Inc .5614681 .0440264 
The example above indicates a positive relation between customer and supplier gross 
profitability with one-year lag. This could suggest that the profitability shock of Air T in 
2003 was induced by the profitability shock of FEDEX in 2002. This example is consistent 
with the average throughout the sample. In fact, in a random sample of 60 customer/supplier 
relationships (given the criteria listed above), I find that 32/60 of the observations show that 
a shock to customer gross profitability in time (t) causes a reaction to the supplier gross 
profitability at time (t+1) in the same direction. Even though this relationship might seem 
weak, there are twice as many observations showing a strong reaction in the same direction 
than the opposite. If one disregards the very weak relationships (those with a supplier 
reaction below 5%), the effect is actually stronger. Now, almost 2/3 of the observations show 
that a positive (negative) shock to profitability causes a positive (negative) reaction to 
supplier profitability of at least 5%. 
Table 15 Number of Observations of Going the Same/Opposite Directions After a 
Customer  Profitability Shock  
 Number of observations going the same 
directions 
Number of observations going opposite 
directions 
 > (+ −) 20% shock to customer profitability 
causes a change in supplier profitability of: 
> (+ −) 20% shock to customer profitability 
causes a change in supplier profitability of: 
% Δ in 
supplier gross 
profitability 
< (+ −) 5% (+ −) 5%-10% > (+ −) 10% < (− +) 5% (− +) 5%-10% > (− +) 10% 
N 8 9 15 14 6 8 
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In order to see some of the effects in detail, take OraSure Technologies (previously named 
Epitope Inc.), a pharmaceutical company specialized in diagnostic testing kits (i.e HIV OTC 
test). OraSure supplies oral specimen devices to LabOne for use in insurance testing. In 
1996, 1997 and 1998, LabOne accounted for 27%, 39.5% and 28%(respectively) of 
OraSure’s product revenues15. From 1996-1997, LabOne experienced a positive shock to 
their gross profitability of 40.6%. One year later, OraSure experienced a 26.7% profitability 
jump. Whether this jump is a direct result of LabOne’s profitability is unclear, however it 
displays an interesting correlation between the two.  
It should be noted however, that there is little evidence that specifically proves that the 
change in supplier profitability was in fact a consequence of the customer profitability shock. 
First, older annual reports were difficult to extract. Moreover, a lot of the firms has been 
merged, acquired, or gone bankrupt, causing annual reports challenging to find. Secondly, of 
those firms that I managed to extract annual reports through company websites or SEC 
filings, I failed at finding significant evidence that the reaction was in fact a direct 
consequence to the customer profitability shock. The findings above should therefore be 
taken with caution when looking at individual firms. Moreover, the customer shock analysis 
fails at providing statistically significant result. Regressing the difference in supplier 
profitability at time (t+1) on the difference in customer profitability at time (t) yields the 
following output.  
Table 16. Regression of Customer Shock at Time (t) to Supplier Profitability 
Difference at Time (t+1) 
 
Δ Supplier Profitability at Time (t+1) 
Customer Profitability Shock at Time (t)  0.0315 
       (0.36) 
Constant   -0.0150 
  (-0.51) 
N 60 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The table above shows that there is a positive relationship between customer profitability 
                                                
15 Epitope 1998 Annual Report, extracted from OraSure Technologies’ website: http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=99740&p=irol-reportsOther  
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shocks at time (t) and the difference in supplier profitability a year later. The problem 
however, is that one will be unable to reject a hypothesis that suggests that there is no casual 
relationship between customer profitability shock at time (t) and supplier profitability 
reaction at time (t+1).   
5.3 Linking Profitability to Customer Momentum 
 Cohen & Frazzini (2008) showed that customers and suppliers are correlated in terms of 
revenue and operating income. Given that revenue and operating income are significant 
factors affecting profitability, it is likely that there is a correlation between customers and 
suppliers with respect to profitability as well. This was confirmed in the analysis in section 
5.1, and in the results from the random sample of shocks to profitability in section 5.2. We 
also know that there is significant evidence suggesting that profitability and asset returns are 
related (Novy-Marx (2013), Fama & French (2014)). Specifically, high profitability stocks 
outperform low profitability stocks. This creates an interesting link. Could profitability be a 
significant factor explaining customer momentum? Cohen & Frazzini (2008) buy and sell 
supplier stocks whose customer has experienced a shock to their share price. Imagine that 
those customer stocks have (on average) high/low profitability. We already know that 
customers and suppliers are correlated in terms of profitability, so what if the supplier stocks 
being purchased/sold also have high/low profitability? As I do not have any details on the 
identity of the stocks being sold/purchased in Cohen & Frazzini (2008), nor any information 
about how many stocks they utilize in their strategy, I cannot test this directly. I can 
however, investigate whether the suppliers of customers with high (low) profitability, also 
have high (low) profitability.   
 In order to investigate this, I study the average gross profitability of the 25 (50)16 worst 
performing customers and the 25 (50) best performing customers every fiscal year. I then 
look at the average supplier gross profitability that is linked to either the “bad” or ”good” 
customers. There will be a large difference in profitability between the average “bad” 
customer and the average “good” customer, but if their average suppliers show the same 
effect, then this could link profitability to customer momentum.  
                                                
16 For the details on the output using 50 firms, please see appendix Table A.3. 
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Table 17 shows the average profitability of the 25 best customers and 25 worst customers 
(by profitability). To the right of the table is average supplier profitability given the two 
customer groups.  The important column in this table is the difference between the low/high 
supplier profitability. 
Table 17. Average profitability of the 25 least profitable customers (low) and the 
25 most profitable customers (high). To the right: average profitability of its linked 
suppliers17  
  
Customer 
  
Supplier 
 
Fyear Low Profitability High Profitability (High-Low) Low Customer Profitability 
High Customer 
Profitability (High-Low) 
1991 -0.0124 1.1991 1.2115 0.3074 0.3809 0.0735 
1992 -0.0813 1.2588 1.3402 0.2819 0.4201 0.1382 
1993 -0.1908 1.1811 1.3719 0.1434 0.4880 0.3446 
1994 -0.1289 1.0491 1.1780 0.1173 0.4465 0.3293 
1995 -0.1346 1.0544 1.1890 -0.0118 0.3577 0.3694 
1996 -0.0962 1.1094 1.2056 0.1243 0.5233 0.3990 
1997 -0.0754 1.1475 1.2229 0.3519 0.4115 0.0596 
1998 -0.1386 1.1444 1.2830 0.2701 0.4053 0.1352 
1999 -0.0968 1.2022 1.2990 0.1761 0.3790 0.2029 
2000 -0.1281 1.2587 1.3868 0.2999 0.3419 0.0420 
2001 -0.1156 1.1464 1.2620 -0.1479 0.5358 0.6837 
2002 -0.1060 1.1109 1.2169 0.3014 0.3083 0.0069 
2003 -0.1008 1.0935 1.1943 0.3500 0.4766 0.1266 
2004 -0.0904 1.0219 1.1123 0.3745 0.4452 0.0707 
2005 -0.1007 0.9957 1.0964 0.2040 0.3888 0.1848 
2006 -0.1186 1.0308 1.1494 0.2517 0.4194 0.1677 
2007 -0.1368 1.0747 1.2115 0.1379 0.4393 0.3015 
2008 -0.1889 0.9624 1.1514 0.3934 0.2781 -0.1153 
2009 -0.1014 0.9308 1.0322 0.4005 0.0842 -0.3162 
The table shows that in 17/19 years there is a positive difference between the average 
supplier of the  “good” customer and the average supplier of the “bad” customer. Moreover, 
this effect seems to be very strong. There are two outliers in this data set however. 2008 and 
2009 show a negative difference between the suppliers of the “bad” and “good” customers. 
This negativity could be temporary, as firms during 2008 and 2009 were under significant 
                                                
17 1990 is missing in the table, as there were too many observations missing for the year 1990. 
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pressure due to the financial crisis. The negative difference could also suggest that the 
correlation between customer and supplier profitability is reduced in newer times. The 
overall result however indicates that (at least in the extremes) customers and suppliers are 
related in terms of profitability. A similar picture also exists if doubling the amount of firms 
used in the analysis. Using 50 firms instead of 25 firms yields a positive difference between 
the average supplier of the “good” customer and the average supplier of the “bad” customer 
in 16/19 years (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). The difference is however stronger for the 
25 firm case, suggesting the effect to be more present in the absolute extremes.  
I link the above findings with customer momentum using the following idea. Assume that 
the high (low) customer return stocks that Cohen & Frazzini (2008) use to form portfolios of 
supplier stocks, also have high (low) profitability. Given that the linked suppliers also tend 
to have high (low) profitability, and that there exists a profitability premium in asset 
markets, this can in return induce return predictability across stocks that are economically 
linked. Up until now, no one has been able to explain the abnormal returns generated by 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008), and while this paper does not provide any empirical evidence that 
this is a profitability issue, it does point out an interesting link.  To this date, no one has 
checked the customer momentum result found by Cohen & Frazzini (2008) up against 
profitability, even though profitability is known to affect asset returns. 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) test the result against several factors. Using Fama & French 
(1993), Carhart (1997) and Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) asset pricing models, they find that 
the customer momentum return is largely left unexplained. Moreover, Cohen & Frazzini 
(2008) also perform a number of robustness tests (see pp. 9-10), yet find that customer 
returns still predicts future supplier returns. A possible extension to this would therefore be 
to test the customer momentum results against a profitability factor. There are a few possible 
options to do this. First, one could test it against Hou, Xu & Zhang (2012)’s q-factor model 
that includes factor loadings such as market, size, investment, and ROE. Alternatively one 
can utilize Fama & French (2014) model that includes a profitability and investment factor. 
This would be interesting for observational purposes, however the model did fail all GRS 
tests. One can also attempt to use Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions, and control for 
profitability similarly to Novy-Marx (2013). Given that Novy-Marx (2013) finds 
profitability to help explain most asset pricing anomalies (especially earnings-related 
anomalies), there is also a possibility that it can explain customer momentum as well.  
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Cohen & Frazzini (2008) argue that customer momentum stems from investor inability to 
extract relevant information about firms’ major customers. It is important to note that I do 
not reject the idea provided by Cohen & Frazzini (2008), rather present other possible 
explanations that could be considered when evaluating the result. In fact, if my ideas about 
profitability affecting customer momentum are true, it is also not unlikely that profitability 
could be subject to some sort of investor inattention. If investors are unable to extract 
information about firms’ major customers, then they are likely to miss this with respect to 
profitability as well. Buying/selling stocks whose customers have high (low) profitability, 
requires just as much attention (if not more) as the customer momentum strategy suggested 
by Cohen & Frazzini (2008). Given the economic links, it is easier to look at stocks with 
high/low returns shocks than having to physically look up the stocks with the highest/lowest 
profitability ratios, and will hence require more attention from the investor’s point of view. 
Moreover, there is also evidence that links the profitability premium to investor inattention. 
In fact, Wang & Yu (2013) find investor inattention to be the likely cause of their 
profitability premium18. They find that the ROE effect is significantly stronger among firms 
suffering the most severe delay to new information, and in stocks with lower trading 
volumes. This suggests that the profitability premium is more pronounced in stocks that are 
more likely to have inattentive investors (Wang & Yu, 2013). Moreover, Wang & Yu (2013) 
show that past profitable (unprofitable) firms will experience positive (negative) earnings 
surprises around earnings announcements days. This is due to the investors initially 
underreacting to profitability, to later revise their expectations around announcement days.  
 
                                                
18 See section 2.4.5 in Litterary Review for more details.  
 42 
6. Conclusion 
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find return predictability amongst assets that are economically 
linked. They argue that this predictability comes from investor limited attention. I have in 
this paper presented theories that could suggest that limited attention is not the sole factor 
affecting the customer momentum return. What started as an investigation on whether 
customers and suppliers differ fundamentally, ended with a proposition that profitability 
could be a significant factor affecting the customer momentum abnormal returns.  
First, the result indicates that both size and profitability differ significantly between 
customers and suppliers. These differences are statistically significant and persistent over 
time. While the data generating process can partly explain size, profitability is more of a 
puzzling issue. I argue throughout this paper that the difference in profitability is likely to 
stem from difference in firm size. Given that operating leverage is much higher for supplier 
firms than customer firms, I argue that economies of scale and hence firm size cause this 
difference in profitability between customers and suppliers. It is however, very difficult to 
rationalize customer momentum using this difference in profitability. It was therefore 
necessary to look at profitability in general and how this might affect the return 
predictability.  
Cohen & Frazzini (2008) find customers and suppliers to be correlated in terms of profits. 
Throughout the paper I find significant evidence suggesting that customer –and supplier 
profitability is correlated as well. Moreover, I show that suppliers of customers with high 
profitability significantly outperformed suppliers of customers with low profitability. 
Selected research also shows that profitability is a significant factor affecting asset returns. 
Combining my findings of profitability correlation with the evidence from the high (low) 
supplier profitability given extreme customer profitability, I argue that profitability may be a 
significant factor causing the customer momentum found by Cohen & Frazzini (2008). 
While the results do not show any empirical evidence, it does point out some interesting 
points that so far have been ignored when analysing customer momentum. Further research 
should examine the impact of profitability on customer momentum, and should test the 
findings of Cohen & Frazzini (2008) up against a profitability factor similar to that of Fama 
& French (2014). Moreover, it would be interesting if further research expanded the 
customer momentum strategy by using extreme customer profitability measures rather than 
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customer stock price shocks. Specifically, one would buy supplier stock if their respective 
customer has an extreme profitability measure.  
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8. Appendix 
Table A.1: Details for Ken French’s 12 Industry Portfolios 
1 NoDur  Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, 
Toys 
          0100-0999 
          2000-2399 
          2700-2749 
          2770-2799 
          3100-3199 
          3940-3989 
 2 Durbl  Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 
          2500-2519 
          2590-2599 
          3630-3659 
          3710-3711 
          3714-3714 
          3716-3716 
          3750-3751 
          3792-3792 
          3900-3939 
          3990-3999 
 3 Manuf  Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com 
Printing 
          2520-2589 
          2600-2699 
          2750-2769 
          3000-3099 
          3200-3569 
          3580-3629 
          3700-3709 
          3712-3713 
          3715-3715 
          3717-3749 
          3752-3791 
          3793-3799 
          3830-3839 
          3860-3899 
 4 Enrgy  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 
          1200-1399 
          2900-2999 
 5 Chems  Chemicals and Allied Products 
          2800-2829 
          2840-2899 
 6 BusEq  Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 
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Table A.2: Profitability Measures Given Different Industries 
 
Profitability for Consumer Non Durables 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.00652 0.0641*** 0.00830 
 (-0.98) (18.19) (1.54) 
N 1850 642 2322 
Op. Profitability 0.100*** 0.172*** 0.115*** 
 (20.26) (40.85) (27.64) 
N 1820 607 2259 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Consumer Durables 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.00967 0.0211*** -0.00172 
 (-1.56) (4.60) (-0.35) 
N 1132 479 1468 
          3570-3579 
          3660-3692 
          3694-3699 
          3810-3829 
          7370-7379 
 7 Telcm  Telephone and Television Transmission 
          4800-4899 
 8 Utils  Utilities 
          4900-4949 
 9 Shops  Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 
          5000-5999 
          7200-7299 
          7600-7699 
10 Hlth   Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 
          2830-2839 
          3693-3693 
          3840-3859 
          8000-8099 
11 Money  Finance 
          6000-6999 
12 Other  Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 
 51 
Op. Profitability 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.105*** 
 (20.27) (24.91) (24.85) 
N 1117 426 1401 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Manufacturing 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA 0.00101 0.0384*** 0.00940 
 (0.09) (14.68) (1.09) 
N 3037 1143 3920 
Op. Profitability 0.102*** 0.133*** 0.109*** 
 (40.46) (57.84) (52.78) 
N 2992 1085 3821 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Energy 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.0216*** 0.0367*** -0.00299 
 (-4.37) (8.82) (-0.79) 
N 1647 806 2247 
Op. Profitability 0.0991*** 0.154*** 0.116*** 
 (22.38) (37.21) (33.09) 
N 1596 765 2166 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Chemicals and Allied Products 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.0250 0.0375*** -0.00316 
 (-1.86) (5.33) (-0.34) 
N 587 370 862 
Op. Profitability 0.110*** 0.150*** 0.123*** 
 (13.60) (25.45) (21.42) 
N 571 368 844 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Profitability for Business Equipment Industry 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.139*** -0.0257*** -0.117*** 
 (-16.29) (-3.89) (-16.25) 
N 7235 2379 8786 
Op. Profitability 0.000401 0.100*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.08) (26.15) (4.49) 
N 6969 2310 8462 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
‘Profitability for Telecom 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.118*** -0.0174* -0.0669*** 
 (-7.45) (-2.57) (-7.61) 
N 594 700 1197 
Op. Profitability 0.0162 0.0984*** 0.0541*** 
 (1.30) (15.25) (7.31) 
N 473 488 903 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Utilities 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA 0.0216*** 0.0282*** 0.0254*** 
 (4.25) (23.99) (12.05) 
N 379 722 986 
Op. Profitability 0.0342 0.107*** 0.0568*** 
 (1.82) (16.98) (3.97) 
N 53 34 74 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Shops (Wholesale, Retail ++) Industry 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.0390*** 0.0394*** 0.0143*** 
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 (-3.88) (17.41) (3.83) 
N 977 2144 2962 
Op. Profitability 0.0506*** 0.138*** 0.111*** 
 (7.26) (72.40) (40.14) 
N 960 2115 2919 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Health Industry 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.219*** -0.00323 -0.162*** 
 (-21.55) (-0.49) (-20.34) 
N 2859 1264 3828 
Op. Profitability -0.0315*** 0.141*** 0.0231*** 
 (-3.91) (24.08) (3.74) 
N 1845 1007 2610 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Money 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.0319 0.0115 -0.0115 
 (-1.23) (1.29) (-0.85) 
N 159 185 330 
Op. Profitability 0.0933*** 0.131*** 0.105*** 
 (5.62) (18.64) (10.17) 
N 132 101 222 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Profitability for Other 
 Supplier firms Customer Firms All firms 
ROA -0.0474** 0.0198*** -0.0252* 
 (-2.96) (4.97) (-2.30) 
N 3472 1775 5109 
Op. Profitability 0.0624*** 0.104*** 0.0747*** 
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 (4.24) (17.76) (7.00) 
N 2439 1074 3417 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table A.3: To the left; Average profitability of the 50 least profitable 
customers(low) and the 50 most profitable customers(high). To the right; the 
average profitability of the suppliers linked to the customers with low 
profitability(low) and the average profitability of the suppliers linked to the 
customers with high profitability (high)    
  
Customer 
  
Supplier 
 
Fyear Low Profitability High Profitability (High-Low) 
Low Customer 
Profitability 
High Customer 
Profitability (High-Low) 
1991 0.0229 1.0154 0.9926 0.3528 0.3632 0.0104 
1992 -0.0156 1.0510 1.0666 0.2751 0.2977 0.0226 
1993 -0.0714 0.9957 1.0670 0.2549 0.3231 0.0682 
1994 -0.0353 0.9470 0.9824 0.2086 0.4259 0.2173 
1995 -0.0429 0.9364 0.9793 0.0367 0.3957 0.3589 
1996 -0.0247 0.9898 1.0145 0.1909 0.3921 0.2012 
1997 -0.0098 1.0047 1.0145 0.3143 0.3298 0.0155 
1998 -0.0471 0.9981 1.0452 0.2369 0.2645 0.0277 
1999 -0.0340 1.0247 1.0587 0.2043 0.2820 0.0778 
2000 -0.0549 1.0354 1.0902 0.2115 0.3768 0.1653 
2001 -0.0442 0.9640 1.0082 0.1507 0.3797 0.2290 
2002 -0.0354 0.9265 0.9618 0.2664 0.3125 0.0461 
2003 -0.0252 0.9247 0.9499 0.2872 0.3714 0.0842 
2004 -0.0217 0.8812 0.9029 0.3277 0.3071 -0.0205 
2005 -0.0217 0.8598 0.8816 0.2391 0.3867 0.1475 
2006 -0.0298 0.8932 0.9230 0.3062 0.3059 -0.0003 
2007 -0.0441 0.8955 0.9396 0.3177 0.3873 0.0696 
2008 -0.0779 0.8212 0.8991 0.3359 0.3885 0.0526 
2009 -0.0224 0.7452 0.7676 0.2956 0.1269 -0.1687 
 
 
 
 
 
